Once the problem has been redefined, the solution is more obvious—change
economic incentives by raising the cost of strategically defaulting, and lower the cost
of staying in a home. Let’s think about how to implement this. One obvious way—
the economic defaulter can stop making mortgage payments and live rent-free in
that home for 20 months, on average (longer in judicial states, less time in nonjudicial
states). An even more mercenary borrower can move to cheaper quarters
and rent out the (defaulted) home, pocketing the proceeds, while still failing to make
the mortgage payments. Borrowers have taken advantage of this—our 3/24/2010
Amherst Mortgage Insight article “Has A More Borrower Friendly Environment
Created A Moral Hazard Problem?” showed that the performance difference
between owner-occupied borrowers who might qualify for modification plans and
non-owner-occupied borrowers who do not qualify—has been widening. One easy
solution—change a borrower’s incentive by taxing the imputed benefit from living in
a home rent free. At the end of each year, a servicer would send the borrower and
the IRS a W-2 Form, detailing the cost of the foregone [mortgage payments + taxes
+ insurance].
economic incentives by raising the cost of strategically defaulting, and lower the cost
of staying in a home. Let’s think about how to implement this. One obvious way—
the economic defaulter can stop making mortgage payments and live rent-free in
that home for 20 months, on average (longer in judicial states, less time in nonjudicial
states). An even more mercenary borrower can move to cheaper quarters
and rent out the (defaulted) home, pocketing the proceeds, while still failing to make
the mortgage payments. Borrowers have taken advantage of this—our 3/24/2010
Amherst Mortgage Insight article “Has A More Borrower Friendly Environment
Created A Moral Hazard Problem?” showed that the performance difference
between owner-occupied borrowers who might qualify for modification plans and
non-owner-occupied borrowers who do not qualify—has been widening. One easy
solution—change a borrower’s incentive by taxing the imputed benefit from living in
a home rent free. At the end of each year, a servicer would send the borrower and
the IRS a W-2 Form, detailing the cost of the foregone [mortgage payments + taxes
+ insurance].
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